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Comment k: A Prescription For The
Over-The-Counter Drug Industry
Thomas M. Moore* and Scott L. Hengesbach**
As an illustration of the existing legal quagmire regarding the
liability of drug manufacturers, consider the following scenarios: In
one scenario, a middle-aged individual undergoes a yearly physical
with his internist who determines that the patient is in a high risk
category for stroke. In order to reduce the risk, the internist prescribes
low doses of the anticoagulant warfarin. After taking the drug as
prescribed over a period of time, the patient suffers not a stroke,
but a significant adverse reaction to the drug. The patient files a
lawsuit for damages contending that the drug manufacturer is strictly
liable for defects in the design of the drug as well as the warnings
provided by the drug manufacturer to the internist.
In the second scenario, a patient undergoes a similar physical
examination by her internist with the same resulting diagnosis. For
this patient, the internist "prescribes" low doses of acetylsalicylic
acid, another well-known blood thinning agent. After taking the drug
as directed for a period of time this patient also suffers a significant
adverse reaction and files a lawsuit against the drug manufacturer
on the theory of strict liability.
Although these hypotheticals seem nearly identical, for the purposes
of determining the liability of the respective drug manufacturers there
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may be a significant distinction. In California, the manufacturer of
the first drug, warfarin, could not be held strictly liable for defects
in design or for its failure to warn about the resulting adverse
reaction. The decision of the California Supreme Court in Brown v.
Superior Court' precludes such a theory in actions involving prescrip-
tion medications. The applicability of strict liability in the second
scenario is somewhat more troublesome. Despite the fact that ace-
tylsalicylic acid may be as efficacious as warfarin in reducing the
risk of stroke2 and, like warfarin, is inherently unsafe to some degree,
the second manufacturer may not be favored with the protective
holding in Brown. The reason is that acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) is
available directly to consumers over-the-counter.
In the arena of tort liability for pharmaceutical-related injuries,
courts and commentators alike have focused their attention almost
exclusively on medications which are available only upon the pre-
scription of a. licensed physician. This is largely attributable to the
fact that, historically, most significant pharmaceutical cases have
dealt with prescription drugs. 3 The lack of over-the-counter (herein-
after OTC) liability analysis also stems from the relative ignorance
of courts and lawyers about the origin of regulatory distinctions
between prescription and OTC products, as well as the social and
economic benefits of OTC medications.
First, this Article will analyze the development of liability for drug-
related injuries in California.4 In that respect, its commentary is not
unique. However, the foregoing analysis will focus on the applica-
bility of traditional theories of product liability and their impact on
the over-the-counter drug industry.5 Second, this Article analyzes the
various approaches that courts may utilize in OTC drug cases in light
of Brown.6 The Article concludes that since OTC products provide
enormous social and economic benefits by encouraging self-medica-
tion, these products should be exempt from strict liability.
1. 1. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
2. 12 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 863, 866-67 (1990).
3. For example, manufacturers of intrauterine devices (IUDs), diethylstilbestrol (DES)
and Bendectine have been deluged by lawsuits alleging various adverse drug reactions.
4. See infra notes 6-75 and accompanying text.
5. The authors are aware of only one other commentary which attempts to analyze the
liability of OTC manufacturers. See Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of The Drug Manu-
facturer To The Consumer, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 135 (1985). However, that article is
essentially a case review which does not address the specific issue of whether strict liability
principles should be applied to OTCs.
6. See infra notes 77-180 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LIABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS IN
CALIFORNIA
Although Brown has been criticized as a radical departure from
both the principles and analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A,7 and the court's seminal decision in 1962, Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. , a review of the historical development
of strict tort liability, especially in the context of pharmaceutical
products, demonstrates that Brown is more akin to a restatement of
preexisting California drug liability law.
A. The Evolution of Strict Products Liability in California
Drawing from concepts first outlined in the concurring opinion of
Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,9 the California
Supreme Court, in Greenman, set forth the doctrine of strict liability
in tort.'0 In Greenman, the court held that a product manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when the manufacturer places a product on
the market, knowing that the product is to be used without inspection
for defects, and the product proves to have a defect that causes
injury to an individual." The imposition of strict liability on mass
product manufacturers was premised upon the policy that regardless
of fault, the producers of defective products should bear the burden
of compensating injured plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the
manufacturers are in a better position to spread the economic losses
resulting from such compensation through insurance and higher
consumer prices.' 2
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). For cases and commentaries
critical of Brown, see, e.g., Comment, Comment k Immunity To Strict Liability: Should All
Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 707 (1989); Humphreys, The Efficacy of
Brown v. Superior Court: Should All Prescription Drugs Be Exempted From Strict Liability?,
PRODUCT SAFETY & LIAIITY REP. (Dec. 22, 1989); Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d
1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1989).
9. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
10. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
11. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
12. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Other courts and commentators
which have embraced the strict tort liability concept have attempted to justify the doctrine on
other grounds. Most notably, it has been suggested that strict liability deters manufacturers
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The strict product liability concept was subsequently developed
nationally and, in 1965, after almost four years of refinement and
debate, the American Law Institute adopted its version of strict
products liability in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in subsection (1)
applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product, and (b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller. 3
Seven years after publication of the Restatement, the California
Supreme Court articulated its unwillingness to be bound by the black-
letter of section 402A. The court, in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,14
adopted a "modified" version of the Restatement. The court elimi-
nated the dual requirement that a product be both "defective" and
"unreasonably dangerous."' 5 The court dismissed the "unreasonably
from developing defective products. See, e.g., Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RuTGERs L. REv. 947, 1015 (1964). The deterrence argument has
been rejected by a number of scholars and has never been explicitly approved by the Supreme
Court in California. See generally Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability,
33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 709-10 (1980); McClellan, Strict Liability For Drug Induced Injuries:
An Excursion Through The Maze of Products Liability, Negligence And Absolute Liability,
25 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 25 (1978). The argument was put forth by Justice Traynor concurring
in Escola, and again by Chief Justice Bird in her dissent in Finn. See Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Finn v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 705, 677 P.2d 1147, 1155, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 888 (1984)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, deterrence would seem to have little significance in the case
of an allegedly defective pharmaceutical product whose risk is unavoidable.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See Prosser, The Assault Upon The
Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (discussing the legal
underpinnings of section 402A).
14. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
15. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. Cronin is significant in its
definition of the role of the Restatement. Many courts and commentators unjustifiably accord
the Restatement almost precedential significance, whereas the document is intended to constitute
a synthesis of opinions collected from many diverse jurisdictions, and is necessarily based only
upon those decisions published up to the date on which the final draft is adopted. Accordingly,
the Restatement is subject to severe analytic limitations. As Professor Page has noted:
While the A.L.I. is a distinguished body, it is a private non-governmental entity.
The courts have ultimate responsibility for translating policy into common-law rules,
and the matter of liability for generic risks, and for toxic products in particular,
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dangerous" language of section 402A, finding that such language
infused negligence concepts into the strict liability doctrine.1 6
Although Cronin refined the test for strict liability, Cronin, like
Greenman before it, failed to define the defectiveness standard. 7 The
California Supreme Court first defined a defective product in the
context of strict liability in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 18 Barker
specifically defined "design" defect. The court held that a product
can be defective in design either if it fails to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and
reasonably foreseeable manner, 9 or if in light of certain factors20 the
risks posed by the design outweigh the benefits.2' Once the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing that the injury was proximately caused
by the product's design, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that the benefits of the design are greater than the
risks .22
requires more comprehensive scrutiny than has been afforded by the Restatement.
Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k And For Strict Tort Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 853, 872 (1983).
16. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
17. 1d. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 (quoting Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rav. 363, 373 (1965)).
18. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). The Barker court identified
three types of product defects. First, the Barker court isolated defects attributable to the
manufacturing process, which resulted in individual product units that differed from the
intended result of the manufacturer. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
Second, the Barker court indicated that there are products which are "perfectly" manufactured,
but are unsafe in the absence of a safety device or alternative specification, such as a defect
in design. Id. at 428, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235. Third, the Barker court noted
that a product may be defective because it lacks adequate warnings or instructions. Id. at 428,
573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
19. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56,, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
20. Id. Several factors should be considered in balancing the risks and benefits of a
product. These factors include the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the technical feasibility of a safer alternative design,
the cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and consumer
that would result from an alternative design. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
237.
21. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 413 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The Barker test has been
incorporated into the California Form Jury Instructions as follows:
A product is defective in design: [1] if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,
or [2] if there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs the benefits
of that design. In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh such risks
you may consider, among other things, the gravity of the danger posed by the
design, the likelihood that such danger would cause damage, the mechanical feasibility
of a safer alternate design at the time of the manufacture, the financial cost of an
improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and the consumer
that would result from an alternate design.
B.A.J.I. 9.00.5.
22. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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The Barker court refused to apply the design defect test to products
which are "inherently" or "unavoidably" unsafe, such as drugs.23
While strict liability for the design of consumer goods such as
machinery and appliances had been steadily developing along the
lines of Greenman and section 402A, cases involving chemicals,
especially drugs, were following a much different path. 24 The Cali-
fornia pharmaceutical decisions during the period between Greenman
and Barker focused exclusively on defects in the manufacturing
process or the warnings provided to the medical community. 25 These
cases all involved prescription drugs. 26 In cases involving product
23. Id. at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10.
24. See Comment, Strict Liability For Prescription Drugs: Which Shall Govern-Comment
k or Strict Liability Applicable To Ordinary Products?, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 309 (1986)
(explaining the history of pharmaceutical liability in California).
25. Many cases involve strict liability claims for manufacturing defects. See, e.g., Fogo
v. Cutter Laboratories, 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); Grinnell v. Pfizer,
274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). The following cases involve a purported
failure to adequately warn: Stevens v. Parke-Davis, 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1973); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971);
Christoffersen v. Kaiser Hospital Foundations, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Love v. Wolf,
226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, 214 Cal. App.
2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963). With the exception of Stevens, the plaintiffs in each of the
warning cases pleaded causes of action for both strict liability and negligence. However,
retrospective examination suggests that although these cases were purportedly analyzed under
the rubric of strict liability, the underlying allegations of warning defect were founded on
negligence. See infra notes 63-68 (discussing the lack of distinction between negligence and
strict liability failure to warn theory).
26. Indeed, the authors are unaware of any California decision where the liability of an
OTC drug manufacturer has been specifically delineated. Hutchinson v. Revlon Corp., 256
Cal. App. 2d 517, 65 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1967), was cited by the court of appeal in Kearl v.
Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 828, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (1985), as a case
involving application of strict liability to an OTC drug. The same case was cited by former
Chief Justice Bird in her dissent in Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 712, 677 P.2d
1147, 1160, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 884 (1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). However, this characteri-
zation would appear to be inaccurate. First, the Hutchinson court did not refer to the product
therein (an external deodorant) as a "drug." Moreover, a deodorant generally would not fall
into the category of "drug" as defined by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (however, a few
internally ingested deodorants used therapeutically in ostomy patients are considered drugs by
the FDA). This mischaracterization typifies the general ignorance of the courts in understanding
the distinction between drugs and other products, and between OTC drugs and prescription
medications in particular. In a recent case, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District was
asked to consider application of comment k to OTC products. Rodriguez v. Superior Court,
90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7610 (to be reported at 271 Cal. Rptr. 204) (July 2, 1990). However,
the court did not reach the issue in that case. Id., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 7611. See infra
notes 78-79 (discussing Rodriguez). Other jurisdictions have analyzed at least the failure to
warn aspect of an OTC drug manufacturer's liability. These cases have generally imposed a
negligence analysis based on comments k and j to Restatement Section 402A, although the
analogy (or lack thereof) between OTC products and prescription drugs has not been discussed.
See Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (applying Georgia
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warnings, the courts held the manufacturer liable if the manufacturer
had actual or constructive knowledge of a particular risk of injury
and failed to adequately inform physicians of the risk, regardless of
whether the plaintiff claimed a negligence, breach of warranty, or
strict liability cause of action. 27 The courts analyzed the failure to
warn defect using non-drug case law,2 8 and comments k and j to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. 29
law); Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790 (Ala. 1984); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175
N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980); Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, Etc., 165 N.J.
Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 402, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 197-98 (1964)
(stating that no rule of strict liability has been applied to a failure to adequately warn of the
risks inherent in the use of a drug). See also Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1065-
66, 751 P.2d 470, 480-81, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421-22 (1988); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,
172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 831-34, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465-67 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Oakes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645,
646-47 Cal. Rptr. 709, 710 (1969) (finding that a chemical manufacturer is not liable for failing
to warn of unknown toxicity).
29. Comments k and j read as follows:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of
risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for
this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription
of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as
to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding
a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known, but
apparently reasonable risk.
j. Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container,
as to its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies,
as for example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required
to warn against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which
a substantial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose
danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would
reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning
against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed
human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous
for other reasons, warning as to use may be required.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
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B. The Development of the Liability of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Prior to the Brown Decision
There is a conspicuous absence of design defect cases involving
pharmaceutical products in California prior to the 1978 Barker
decision. However, in McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co.,30 an appellate
court refused to hold the defendant drug manufacturer liable since
the plaintiff failed to identify the defendant as the manufacturer of
the actual pills her mother ingested.3' The plaintiff claimed that her
mother's ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (DES) caused the plaintiff to
suffer a benign cell disorder of the cervix described as vaginal
adenosis. 32 The court partially justified its decision by finding that
comment k "compels rejection of the imposition of liability." '33 The
court reasoned that comment k discourages the imposition of liabil-
ity. 34 The court, out of cited concern for research and development
of new chemotherapeutic agents and reduction in the costs of medical
care, rejected strict liability.35
Despite the addition of the Barker design defect analysis to the
armament of the plaintiffs' bar, the issue of the application of strict
tort liability to manufacturers of pharmaceutical products was not
discussed again in California until 1984 in Finn v. G.D. Searle &
Co.3 6 In Finn, the California Supreme Court affirmed a defense
verdict in favor of a prescription drug manufacturer. The lawsuit
was brought on behalf of a child who allegedly became permanently
and almost totally blind subsequent to treatment for a skin ailment
with high doses of a prescription drug. 37 The plaintiff proceeded to
trial on a complaint sounding in negligence and strict liability,
30. 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978).
31. Id. at 82-84, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 733-35. The supreme court subsequently eliminated
the identification element in cases where the plaintiff cannot prove who manufactured the
drug she actually ingested in situations where the same drug was marketed by more than one
company. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980).
32. McCreery, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 79-80, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
33. Id. at 80, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
34. Id. at 86-87, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 736. This portion of the court's opinion is arguably
dicta since the reference to comment k was unnecessary given the inability of the plaintiff to
identify the defendant's drug. Nevertheless, the case is significant as the first reported opinion
discussing the liability of a drug manufacturer for defective design.
35. Id.
36. 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984).
37. Id. at 695, 677 P.2d at 1149, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
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although both causes of action were predicated on an alleged failure
to warn. 8 On review, when the California Supreme Court was asked
to consider whether jury instructions modified by the trial court
erroneously failed to articulate a cause of action for failure to warn
based on strict liability, the majority refused to decide the strict
liability issue, observing that the plaintiff's own proposed instruc-
tions, which conditioned liability on the manufacturer's actual or
constructive knowledge of drug risks, were based not upon strict
liability, but on negligence.3 9
The Finn case is probably most noteworthy for the dissent of
former Chief Justice Bird. Chief Justice Bird vigorously argued that
a prescription drug manufacturer may be held strictly liable for both
warning inadequacies as well as defects in design.40 Subsequently,
several cases addressing strict liability of prescription drugs began to
proceed through the appellate courts, but only one decision, Kearl
v. Lederle Laboratories,41 was ordered published.
Kearl was the first California decision since McCreery to specifi-
cally address the strict liability design defect issue in a prescription
drug case. In Kearl, a California court of appeal held that only those
38. The jury instructions proffered by the plaintiff, as well as those modified by the
court, indicated that the manufacturer was liable only for dangers about which the manufacturer
"knew or should have known" prior to the plaintiff's ingestion of the drug. The court also
deleted the word "strict" from the proposed instructions. Id. at 697-98, 677 P.2d at 1150-51,
200 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
39. Id. at 698, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874. Arguably, the majority was
unjustified in skirting the strict liability issue. In analyzing the failure to warn defect, the
court pointed out that other jurisdictions considering the issue were divided on whether
foreseeability is a necessary element in a failure to warn case ostensibly based on strict liability.
Id. at 699, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874. By holding that the proposed instructions
of the plaintiff sounded in negligence, the majority impliedly (1) adopted the foreseeability
requirement, and (2) recognized that in view of that requirement there is no theoretical
distinction between negligence and strict liability when the issue is failure to warn. See infra
notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of distinction between negligence and
strict liability failure to warn theory).
40. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 705, 677 P.2d at 1155, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Bird's dissent in Finn is significant in that it provides a detailed
analysis of those theories which were ultimately rejected by the supreme court in Brown. The
former Chief Justice suggested that California ought not follow comment k to the extent that
the comment exempts drug manufacturers from design defect liability. Id. at 720-22, 677 P.2d
at 1166-68, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 889-91 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The dissent alternatively argued
that if comment k is adopted, a manufacturer should continue to be held "strictly liable" to
the extent that the plaintiff can demonstrate that the manufacturer's warning is inadequate.
Id. In the authors' opinion, this contention is based upon an erroneous interpretation of
comment k owing to an ambiguity in the language of the Restatement. The ambiguity may
arguably have survived Brown and is responsible for several inconsistent decisions subsequent
to that case. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing recent strict liability failure
to warn case law).
41. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
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prescription drugs which are sufficiently beneficial yet substantially
and unavoidably unsafe, and which possess an interest in availability
which outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability
via strict liability, should be protected by comment k.42 In Kearl, the
plaintiff contracted polio after receiving an oral polio vaccine. 43 The
plaintiff contended that the vaccine manufacturer was strictly liable
for marketing a defectively designed product and for failing to
adequately warn about the attendant risks. 44
The court of appeal stated that the trial court must first determine
whether the vaccine was "unavoidably unsafe." If so, the drug is
exempt from strict liability pursuant to comment k.45 Further, the
court found that the manufacturer could be held liable only for
failure to warn of known or constructively known risks (i.e., negli-
gence) .46
42. Id. at 829-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64. The court was "uncomfortable with the rather
routine and mechanical fashion by which many appellate courts have concluded that certain
products, particularly drugs, are entitled to such special treatment." Id. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr.
at 463. The court proposed a mixed analysis of law and fact to be made by the trial court
after an evidentiary hearing outside of the jury's presence. The trial court would take evidence
as to: (1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally
important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the then-existing risk
posed by the product was both "substantial" and "unavoidable"; and (3) whether the interest
in availability outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through strict
liability design defect review. If the answer to all three threshold questions was in the
affirmative, the manufacturer would be exempt from strict products liability design defect
analysis. Id. at 829-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
43. Id. at 817-20, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 454-56.
44. Id. at 820, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57. Although vaccines are rarely "prescribed" in
the usual sense of the term, vaccines have traditionally been treated the same as prescription
drugs for the purposes of liability analysis (except in failure to warn cases where the learned
intermediary doctrine has not been employed). See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboiatories, 498
F.2d 1264, 1275-78 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Texas law). Additionally, vaccines would appear
to be protected by comment k independently and without regard to their prescription or non-
prescription status. See supra note 29 (providing the language of comment k).
45. In dicta contained in a footnote, the court suggested that the defendant would still
be theoretically liable for a negligent design even if comment k applied. Kearl, 172 Cal. App.
3d at 831 n.15, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 465 n.15. However, the viability of such a theory should be
seriously questioned in view of Brown. See infra note 63 (discussing the viability of a negligent
design cause of action after Brown).
46. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66. Consistent with prior drug-
liability decisions, Kearl appears to go beyond comment k in analyzing the "warning defect."
The court discussed one of its previous decisions, Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 95
Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979), often cited by other courts for the proposition
that product manufacturers could be held strictly liable for warning defects. Cavers figured
prominently in the dissent of Chief Justice Bird in Finn. The Kearl court noted that "contrary
to dicta in Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co. and the Finn dissent suggestion ... nothing in Cavers
suggests, nor was it intended to imply, that failure to warn can or should be subject to an
analysis different from negligence simply because it happens to be alleged as a basis of product
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The Kearl court recognized that subjecting manufacturers of una-
voidably unsafe products to either of Barker's two standards for
determining defectiveness might cause delay in the marketing of
products, deter the research and development of new chemical enti-
ties, or deter the manufacturing and marketing of certain agents
altogether. 47 The court also found that the increased costs of pro-
duction-resulting in part from larger insurance premiums-might so
increase the price of drugs that they would be placed outside the
reach of those who need them most. 48 However, while the court
painstakingly drew a nexus between the ultimate imposition of strict
design defect liability and a potential decrease in pharmaceutical
development and availability, the court failed to analyze the impact
of its ad hoc "mini-trial" approach on that same societal goal.
Although the court of appeal in Kearl did not determine whether
the vaccine at issue qualified for comment k protection, 49 at least
one jurisdiction has imposed strict design defect liability on a pre-
scription drug manufacturer. 50 Given the somewhat unique approach
to comment k advanced by the court of appeal in Kearl, and the
increasing number of prescription drug cases meandering their way
through the judicial system at the time, it was inevitable that the
California Supreme Court would have to address the issue it so deftly
avoided in Finn.
defect. [Cavers] simply attempts to give the jury guidance in determining the reasonableness
of a warning or the reasonable need for a warning in a typical products liability case." Kearl,
172 Cal. App. 3d at 833 n.17, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 466 n.17.
47. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 822-24, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 458-60.
48. Id. at 823-24, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The cases and commentary in support of the
policy of encouraging development and availability of drug products, as well as the litany of
examples of the deleterious effect of products liability on the drug industry cited by the Kearl
court, were adopted almost verbatim by the supreme court in Brown. See Brown v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1063-64, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 420-21 (1988).
49. Kearl was ultimately settled before a mini-trial was held on whether comment k
applied to the vaccine at issue. Telephone conversation with Richard J. Siggins, Esq., partner
in the firm of Gudmundson, Siggins & Stone, attorneys for defendant Lederle Laboratories,
April 24, 1990 (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
50. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (lst Cir. 1981). In Brochu,
the plaintiff allegedly suffered a stroke during the time she was taking an oral contraceptive
and contended that the manufacturer could have decreased the product's milligram content of
estrogen, arguably making a stroke less likely, without any accompanying decrease in efficacy.
Id. at 654. The court held that the plaintiff had set forth a claim under New Hampshire law
for design defect based on the high content of estrogen in the product and the danger resulting
from the estrogen level. Id. at 655. Brochu has been criticized and arguably constitutes a
misapplication of comment k and a tortured interpretation of the phrase "unavoidably unsafe."
See Comment, Can A Prescription Drug Be Defectively Designed?-Brochu v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 31 DE PAuL L. REv. 247 (1981).
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C. The Brown Decision
Brown v. Superior Court5' provided the first opportunity for the
California Supreme Court to consider, in detail, the liability of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer.5 2 In Brown, the court rejected strict
liability for design defects in drugs, finding that a prescription drug
manufacturer can be liable only if a drug is improperly manufactured
or if the manufacturer failed to adequately warn of "known or
knowable" side effects.53
In Brown, the plaintiffs contended that the prescription drug
diethylstilbestrol (DES), a miscarriage preventative, was defectively
designed and the defendants knew of its dangerous propensities and
failed to warn the medical community.5 4 The drug manufacturer
contended that DES comported with the "state of the art" when
developed and distributed, and that similarly, the warnings dissemi-
nated to the medical community reflected the risks which were known
at the time of distribution. Both the trial court and court of appeals
rejected the design defect analysis in Barker and the ad hoc approach
of Kearl, and embraced the policy and analysis of comment k. 5
With respect to the issue of design defect, the supreme court found
that it would be inappropriate to apply the analysis of Barker to
drug manufacturers.5 6 In rejecting the first prong of the Barker test,
the court noted that the expectations of an "ordinary consumer" of
prescription drugs are normally those expectations the physician
relates to the consumer, and the physician may not disseminate all
51. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
52. In Stevens v. Parke-Davis, 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973), the
court upheld a jury verdict against a prescription drug manufacturer. However, that case
primarily concerned questions of evidence and attorney misconduct. Id. at 63-73, 507 P.2d at
660-67, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 52-59. Additionally, plaintiff's claim in that case was predicated
solely on a theory of negligent failure to warn. Id. at 64-65, 507 P.2d at 660-61, 107 Cal,
Rptr. at 52-53.
53. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069, 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. The holding
of the court is potentially much more far-reaching. The court arguably eliminated any theory
of design defect, including a cause of action predicated on negligence. See infra note 63
(analyzing the viability of a negligent design cause of action after Brown).
54. Id. at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
55. See Brown v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986)
(depublished when review granted).
56. Brown, at 1061-62, 751 P.2d at 477-78, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419. See supra note 21
(providing the complete language of the Barker test).
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of the warnings included in the manufacturer's label . 7 The Brown
court gave far more consideration to the second prong of the Barker
test, the risk-benefit analysis.5 8
The court rejected the defendant's claim that the Barker risk-
benefit analysis is inapposite to prescription drugs because it contem-
plates that a safer alternative design is feasible. The court observed
that it is at least theoretically possible to "re-design" a drug such as
DES to make the drug safer. 9 Further, there may be less harmful
drugs available to prevent miscarriage! 0 Nevertheless, the court re-
jected extension of the Barker analysis to pharmaceutical products
by looking to the broader question of whether strict liability ought
to be imposed on drug manufacturers in the first instance.6 1 The
court balanced the policy of imposing strict liability for design defects
as originally articulated in Greenman against the policy of encour-
aging development and availability of drugs at a reasonable price.
The court found an important distinction between prescription drugs
and machinery, namely the public interest in the development, avail-
ability, and reasonable price of drugs. 62
57. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1061-62, 751 P.2d at 477-78, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419. This analysis
is open to question since some prescription drugs are provided to consumers with little or no
physician input and may require direct warning to patients pursuant to Food and Drug
Administration rule-making. See Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 833
n.18, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 466 n.18 (1985); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1275-
78 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
And Consumer-Directed Information-Enhancing The Safety Of Prescription Drug Use, 34
CATH. U.L. REv. 117 (1984). Conversely, many OTC products, such as aspirin given to prevent
stroke, require a significant amount of physician intervention. See infra note 119. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the Brown court was more concerned with whether the Barker test should apply
than whether it could apply. See Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1062, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 419.
58. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1062-65, 751 P.2d at 478-80, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419-21. This is
understandable in that the reasons for the court's rejection of Barker's risk-benefit examination
provided a springboard for an attack on the Kearl mini-trial approach, which shares a number
of common elements.
59. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1062, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1062-65, 751 P.2d at 478-80, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419-21.
62. Id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. The supreme court's reliance on
this broader social policy, reflecting both the application of Barker and the threshold test for
comment k protection espoused by Kearl, has led some commentators and courts to suggest
that Brown goes beyond comment k and potentially exempts from strict liability any product
which benefits society through alleviation of pain and suffering without regard to whether the
product could have been designed to be safer; that is, unavoidably unsafe. See Humphreys,
supra note 8, at 1276; Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1989).
Such a conclusion would appear to be erroneous on several counts. First, Brown's interpretation
of comment k, which by definition applies only to "unavoidably unsafe" products, is that
comment k extends at least to all prescription drugs. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069 n.l1, 751
P.2d at 482 n.11, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.11. Second, the court recognized that while some
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To determine the liability of a pharmaceutical manufacturer for
injuries, the court looked to the test outlined in comment k. 63 The
drugs could arguably be made "safer," they cannot be made "safe," which is the terminology
used in the comment. Id. at 1062, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419. As the Brown
court observed, in addition to their social benefit, an important distinction between drugs and
other products is that "unlike other important medical products (wheelchairs, for example),
harm to some users from prescription drugs is unavoidable." Id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. Thus, in Brochu for example, a decrease in the amount of estrogen
contained in the birth control pills at issue might have reduced the risk of stroke but would
not have eliminated it. Finally, unlike the manufacturer of a machine who could at least
contemplate the nature and range of potential product risks on a pre-market basis (even though
identification of the actual defects in the product giving rise to those risks might not be
affected at the time of distribution), a drug manufacturer may have no idea of the character
of the side effects of its products, as such side effects may not manifest themselves until years
or even decades after initial marketing. Such a manufacturer, unlike the producer of a machine
who can simply "design out" the defect once it is identified, may have to choose between
subjecting itself to at least some liability for unforeseen dangers or pulling the drug from the
market.
63. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418. By omitting the
phrase "strict liability" from its holding, the court arguably turned to comment k for a
standard by which all forms of design defect liability are to be litigated in the pharmaceutical
context. Although the issue of negligent design was not specifically raised on appeal, the
opinion certainly leaves open the question of whether such a theory remains viable in a
prescription drug case. In a latter portion of the opinion, the court noted that drug manufac-
turers may still be liable for manufacturing defects, as well as "under general principles of
negligence, and for failure to warn of known or reasonably knowable side effects." Id. at
1069 n.12, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.12. Since both the risk-benefit prong
of Barker and the Kearl mini-trial focus on primarily the same factors as the traditional risk-
utility test in negligent design cases, the Brown court's rejection of the Barker risk-benefit
prong would seem to apply with equal significance to all theories of recovery based on an
allegedly defective design. See generally Birnbaum, Unmasking The Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. Rav. 593 (1980)
(discussing negligence principles). Indeed, the Brown court refused to pass on whether the
benefits of certain pharmaceutical agents justified their development and marketing. Brown,
44 Cal. 3d at 1065 n.10, 751 P.2d at 480 n.10, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421 n.10. A negligent design
defect cause of action would compel the jury to conduct just such an assessment. The court
of appeal in Kearl noted in dicta that a negligent design defect cause of action would continue
to be viable. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 827, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453,
462 (1985). However, that observation was consistent with the court's holding since under the
mini-trial approach there would already be a "risk-benefit" issue. The only cases of which
the authors are aware specifically addressing the effect of comment k on design defect actions
sounding in negligence are Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987),
White v. Wyeth Laboratories, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E.2d 748 (1988), and Toner v.
Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987). In Toner, a divided court held that
comment k was not a defense to a negligent design defect case, although it acknowledged that
a jury analysis of the issue under a negligence theory was indistinguishable from strict liability,
the application of which is precluded by comment k. Id., 732 P.2d at 305. But see id., 732
P.2d at 314 (Bakes, J., specially concurring in part) (comment k should be a defense). In
Graham, the district court pointed out that, by "comment k's own terms, the comment bars
only strict liability claims . . . ." Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1497. However, the court noted
that the question of whether a manufacturer acted negligently "is, in a general sense, similar
to the comment k inquiry of whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe." Id. at 1498. The court
went on to note that a judicial determination of whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe would
involve the "same evidence" that a jury would hear in determining whether a drug was
negligently designed. Id.
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court noted that although comment k is located in the Restatement
section encompassing strict liability, comment k is in fact an artic-
ulation of a negligence standard 4 Comment k focuses on the man-
ufacturer's conduct in warning or failing to warn of the risks within
the manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge. 61 Contrary to
prior California decisions and cases in other jurisdictions, which have
interpreted comment k as a "shield" from strict liability,66 the Brown
court interpreted in comment k an exemption,6 7 whereby cases in-
volving "unavoidably unsafe" products are funneled back into the
realm of negligence. 61
64. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059, 751 P.2d at 475, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417. This is consistent
with prior California cases, as well as the majority of cases in other jurisdictions which have
analyzed the comment. See, e.g., Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218
Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971);
Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). Other
jurisdictions have analyzed the cjnment as well. See, e.g., DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories,
Etc., 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983); Werner v. Upjohn Co. Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980)
cert. denied 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 637 F.2d 87 (2d
Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D.
Md. 1975) (interpreting District of Columbia law) aff'd 567 F.2d 269 (1977); Basko v. Sterling,
416 F.2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1969) (applying Connecticut law); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. App. 1979). See generally Schwartz,
Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning And Policy Behind Comment k, 42
WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1139 (1985); Merrell, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59
VA. L. R . 1 (1973).
65. Brown, -44 Cal. 3d at 1065-66, 751 P.2d at 480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22. In analyzing
the "failure to warn" aspect of comment k, Brown, like Kearl and prior pharmaceutical
liability cases, cited both drug and non-drug precedent for the proposition that the applicable
analysis is one of negligence, regardless of whether plaintiff proceeds on a strict liability
theory. Id. The authors are aware of only one published opinion in California which attempts
to draw a clear-cut distinction between negligence and strict liability for failure to warn,
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772, 266 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1990) petition for review granted and opinion superseded, 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74
(1990). Anderson was decided after Brown and interprets Brown as having limited its negligence
analysis to prescription drug cases decided pursuant to comment k. Id. at 783, 266 Cal. Rptr.
at 211. The dissenting justice criticized the majority for departing from precedent in both
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical cases, and for failing to recognize that comment j,
which is not limited to unavoidably unsafe products, contains the same elements of foreseeability
and reasonable conduct. Id. at 787-88, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15. (Goertzen, J., dissenting).
The argument advanced by the dissent was similar to the reasoning of the majority in another
post-Brown non-drug case, Persons v. Salomon North America, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 168,
265 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1990). See also Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 251
Cal. Rptr. 805 (1988). The Anderson case would appear to be an aberration and is more in
line with the former Chief Justice's dissent in Finn, which has never been adopted by the
California Supreme Court.
66. See infra note 76 (discussing the cases employing the affirmative defense approach).
67. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417. Accord, Patten
v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah 1987) (applying Utah law).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 388 (1965) (outlining the negligence doctrine).
There has been an enormous amount of confusion both before and after Brown concerning
whether any form of strict liability remains for either defective design or failure to warn. This
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Although both Brown and Kearl adopted comment k and reached
a similar drug liability policy and analysis of warning defects, the
confusion has stemmed from an ambiguity in comment k which has been paraphrased in many
decisions, including Brown. Specifically, comment k would appear to exempt manufacturers
of unavoidably unsafe products from strict liability, but only if the manufacturer gives proper
warning of a product's dangerous propensities. See supra note 29 (providing the text of
comment k). In dealing with this language, a number of cases and commentators have simply
regurgitated the phrase and have concluded that a drug manufacturer may be held "strictly
liable" to the extent its warnings are inadequate, without explaining how this can be the case
when, admittedly, the analysis to be employed by the jury is predicated upon a standard of
reasonable care; that is, negligence. See e.g., Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 90 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 7610 (to be reported at 271 Cal. Rptr. 114 (July 2, 1990)) (interpreting Brown and
Finn); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Ca. 1989)
(interpreting Brown); Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying
Arkansas law); Coursen v. A.H. Robbins, 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Oregon
law); Kirk v. M. Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987);
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987) cert. denied 485 U.S. 942
(1988); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984); McKee v. Moore,
648 P.2d 21 (Ok. 1982); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307
A.2d 449 (1973); Comment, Brown v. Superior Court: A Tonic For Prescription Drug
Manufacturers, 16 W. ST. L. REv. 753, 762 (1989); Kelly, The Relevancy of Drug Efficacy
Evidence In Strict Liability Actions: Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 14 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 629, 640 (1981). One theory emanating from the ambiguous terminology that has
been adopted in at least two jurisdictions was outlined in detail by Chief Justice Bird in her
dissent in Finn. The Chief Justice suggested that although comment k arguably introduces the
element of "foreseeability" into an action for strict liability based on failure to warn, the
focus continues to be on the product, as opposed to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
conduct. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 705, 677 P.2d 1147, 1155, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 870, 878 (1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, while the manufacturer utilizing
comment k could attempt to prove its lack of knowledge with regard to the drug risk at issue,
the defendant's conduct in obtaining information or in using such information, for the purpose
of product labeling, would be irrelevant. See also Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho
398, 732 P.2d 297 (1987); Woodhill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194
(1980). The view espoused in the Finn dissent ignores the clear meaning of comments k and
j which focus, as the Brown court clearly recognized, on the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct both in terms of gleaning scientific data and in disseminating that information.
The disputed language in comment k indicates that the manufacturer must provide warnings
"where the situation calls for it," a significant caveat suggesting that there may be instances
where a manufacturer has knowledge of a risk, but where such knowledge may not trigger a
duty to warn. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 701, 677 P.2d at 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 876. See also
Basko v. Sterling, 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2nd Cir. 1969). Certainly the court in Brown was not
amenable to such theoretical hair-splitting as it unabashedly referred to the "comment k
negligence standard." Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423. It
appears that the only case to have specifically addressed the effect of the ambiguity in comment
k is Kearl. After explaining that the test contained in comment k is predicated upon a negligent
failure to warn analysis, the Kearl court noted that: "[I1t would be incorrect to view an
unavoidably dangerous product as subject to strict products liability design defect analysis, or
as presumptively defective, simply because such a product may lack a warning .... The test
for whether a warning must be given is one of reasonableness; because there may be unavoidably
dangerous products that reasonably required no warning, such products would not be defective
by mere absence of warning." Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 831 n.15,
218 Cal. Rptr. at 465 n.15 (1985) (citations omitted). It is clear that for the policy recognized
by Brown to be fully implemented, a drug manufacturer must not have to wait until trial to
know whether it will be subjected to strict liability. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d at
1068-69, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424 (1988).
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cases differ on the scope of comment k. The supreme court advocated
blanket protection for prescription drugs in Brown, while Kearl
espoused a drug-by-drug examination.
The Brown court embraced the "unavoidably unsafe" concept
from Kearl but disapproved of the Kearl procedure for implementing
the concept.69 The Brown court recognized the general appeal of the
premise behind the mini-trial approach, observing that "it seems
unjust to grant the same protection from liability to those who gave
us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin. ' 70 The court indi-
cated that it would seriously consider a workable method to confine
the benefit of the comment k negligence standard to clearly beneficial
drugs while denying the privilege to those that are clearly harmful.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "[w]e know of no means by
which that can be accomplished without substantially impairing the
public interest in the development and marketing of new drugs,
because the harm to this interest arises in the very process of
attempting to make the distinction."' 71 Therefore, the court concluded
that all prescription drugs must be protected by comment k, and
exempt from strict liability, as a matter of law. 72
69. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
70. Id.
71. Id. In a detailed critique of the Kearle approach, the court pointed out that an ad
hoc determination of pharmaceutical risks and benefits as a prerequisite to protection from
strict liability would mean that a drug manufacturer would have
no assurance that a product he places on the market will be measured by the liability
standard of comment k because a trial judge could decide that the benefit of the
drug was not "exceptionally important" so as to make its availability "highly
desirable," or that the interest in its availability did not outweigh the public's interest
in subjecting the producer from strict liability.
Id. The court referred to several examples where the Kearle approach would lead to gross
inconsistencies in the application of the strict liability doctrine to drug manufacturers. The
court noted that there would be a disincentive to introduce potentially superior competing
products onto the market if the manufacturer would be held strictly liable for harmful side
effects because a trial court could decide "perhaps many years later" that another product
previously or subsequently available could have accomplished the same therapeutic result. Id.
at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423. Additionally, the court recognized that
individual drugs may have several therapeutic indications, and that while the risk-benefit
assessment might favor a drug given to one plaintiff, the balance could tip in favor of a
plaintiff in another case where the drug was used to treat a dissimilar, less threatening
condition. Id. The court was most concerned about potentially inconsistent findings by different
judges, different juries, and by the judge and jury in the same case. Id.
72. Id. at 1068-69, 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. It is clear that instead of
rejecting the requirement that a product, in order to qualify for comment k protection, be
deemed unavoidably unsafe, the court made a determination that prescription drugs as a class
of products fulfill that prerequisite. This conclusion is inescapable inasmuch as the court held
that while the scope of comment k appears "unclear," it "was intended to and should apply
to all prescription drugs." Id. at 1069 n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482 n.11, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.ll.
Such intent is derived from the critical observation that in order for the policy of comment k
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The blanket protection of Brown is consistent with cases from a
number of other jurisdictions. 73 However, while the California Su-
preme Court casually suggested that its comment k analysis has been
adopted by "almost all our sister states," ' 74 there appears to be
substantial division among those courts.71 Given the prominent role
of California in the development of product liability law, the Brown
decision will unquestionably become a focal point in the disposition
of pharmaceutical litigation all across the country. Indeed, Brown
has been analyzed by courts outside of California as well as in legal
commentary, and predominantly has been criticized for its categorical
exemption of prescription drugs.76
While courts in other jurisdictions continue to grapple with Brown
and the scope of comment k in the context of prescription drugs, it
to be fully implemented, the industry must be assured prior to the undertaking of research
and development that it will not be subject to strict liability. See also supra notes 42-50 and
accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Kearl mini-trial on the pharmaceutical
industry).
73. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1969) (applying Connecticut
law); McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976); Leibowitz
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1972).
74. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069; 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
75. Compare cases cited supra note 73 (applying the blanket approach) with Hill v. Searle
Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas law); Coursen v. A.H. Robbins
Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432
(D. Minn. 1988) (applying Minnesota law); Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233
(D. Utah 1987) (applying Utah law); White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 40 Ohio St. 3d 390,
533 N.E.2d 748 (1988); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988);
Sean v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988); Toner v. Lederle
Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987) cert. denied 485 U.S. 942 (1988); Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984). Interestingly, while the Rhode
Island Supreme Court opted for the case-by-case approach, the court, citing Brown, noted
without direct refutation that, "[t]he threat of the imposition of strict liability even on a case-
by-case basis, would undermine the public interest in the development and availability of
drugs." Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 781 (citation omitted).
76. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas
law); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988) (interpreting
Minnesota law); Hawkinson v. A. H. Robbins Co., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984)
(applying Colorado law). These cases embrace the comment k concept but inappropriately
treat comment k as an affirmative defense which essentially compels the manufacturer to
justify, as a threshold matter, its decision to market the drug. See, e.g., Hill, 884 F.2d at
1068. Ironically, but not surprisingly, these cases help to underscore the inherent difficulties
in approaching comment k protection on an ad hoc basis. For example, Hill adopts comment
k but refuses to extend the comment's protection to the manufacturer of a "prescription"
intrauterine device. Id. at 1069-70. Several other jurisdictions, including California, have
applied comment k to precisely the same device. See, e.g., Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1539, 231 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1986), cause dismissed, remanded, Collins
v. Karoll, 761 P.2d 102, 251 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1988); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla.
1982). The manufacturer of such a product is thus left with no real benefit, even in those
jurisdictions which have extended comment k protection, since liability is contingent upon
venue rather than the policy of encouraging research and development. Some commentators
have been critical of the Brown decision. See, e.g., Humphreys, supra note 8.
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is highly likely that California will move forward to consider the
more far-reaching implications of the decision. These implications
include, most prominently, the question of how the courts are to
deal with non-prescription medications.
II. THE APPLICATION OF BROWN To OVER-THE-COUNTER
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
Although most reported adverse drug reactions involve prescription
products,7 7 the regulatory trend towards increased self-medication,
and the marketing of increasingly potent over-the-counter medicines,
will inevitably thrust the strict liability issue into the OTC arena.78
77. Comment, Strict Liability In Tort: Its Applicability To Manufacturers of Prescription
Drugs, 7 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 487, 487 n.2 (1974) (finding that 95% of reported adverse drug
reactions involve prescription drugs). This figure probably understates current statistics since
it does not take into account the effect of a number of prescription drugs that have been
converted to OTC status in the past fifteen years. The figure also fails to reflect significant
new areas of potential litigation involving "old" OTC products including aspirin (Reyes
Syndrome), acetaminophen (kidney damage), and L-tryptophan (blood dyscrasia).
78. In Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7610 (to be reported at 271
Cal. Rptr. 114) (July 2, 1990), the Fifth District Court of Appeal had the opportunity to
determine for the first time the applicability of comment k and Brown to an over-the-counter
product. This case involved a child who allegedly contracted Reyes Syndrome after ingesting
aspirin. The plaintiff brought suit against the aspirin manufacturer in a complaint stating
causes of action predicated, inter alia, on strict liability for alleged defects in the drug's design
as well as in the warnings provided by the company. Id., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 7610.
The defendant manufacturer brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings prior to trial
seeking to preclude the strict liability counts on the grounds that comment k, and the policies
identified by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Court, were applicable to some non-
prescription drugs such as aspirin. Id. The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff
petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of mandate. Id. In a unanimous opinion, the court
of appeal refused to determine whether comment k should be applied to non-prescription
medications concluding that "such a consideration is premature." Id. The court (erroneously)
interpreted comment k as leaving open the possibility of a strict liability cause of action to
the extent that a plaintiff alleges that the manufacturer's warnings were inadequate. See id. at
7611. In addition, the court mistakenly construed a prior court of appeal decision in Cavers
v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979), as establishing
strict liability for failure to warn. See Rodriguez, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 7611. The
holding in Rodriguez is unfortunate. First, the court side-stepped the still unanswered question
of whether comment k will apply to OTC medications. Id. Moreover, the decision adds to the
already significant confusion surrounding the nature of the failure to warn defect both in
terms of general product liability litigation and in pharmaceutical cases in particular. The court
inexplicably ignored critical language contained in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal.
App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985) in which the First District Court of Appeal endeavored
to clarify its earlier decision in Cavers noting that failure to warn analysis is firmly rooted in
the doctrine of "negligence." Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 831 n.15, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 465
n.15. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing Kearl and Cavers). Most trouble-
some, however, is the court's failure to discuss the effect of its holding on the policies espoused
by the supreme court in Brown, which are explicitly- designed to provide assurances to the
pharmaceutical industry that it will not be held strictly liable for defects in design and warnings.
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Courts considering the strict liability design issue79 after Brown
will likely choose between three possible approaches in handling OTC
products: (1) No protection for non-prescription drugs, (2) protection
limited to some, but not all, OTC drugs, or (3) "blanket" protection
extended to all drugs, prescription and OTC, as defined by the Food
and Drug Administration.
A. The "No Exemption" Approach
Given the lack of explicit precedent for extending comment k
protection to OTC medications, it would not be surprising for a
court, relying on a literal interpretation of Brown and its progeny,
to preclude any OTC exemption from strict liability. This approach
would be based on the contentions that (1) comment k was not
intended to apply to non-prescription drugs, and (2) the social policy
underlying the Brown court's decision to protect prescription drugs
does not apply to non-prescription pharmaceutical products.
1. The Scope of Comment k
Although there has been a great deal of debate on the issue,80
California case law seems to favor the interpretation that, at the very
least, comment k was intended to exempt all prescription products
from strict design defect liability. 8' The question of whether comment
If the Rodriguez analysis is to be applied literally, manufacturers will not know until the jury
returns a verdict on the failure to warn cause of action whether they will be subject to strict
liability. Rodriguez, therefore, totally circumvents Brown by allowing a plaintiff to plead
around Brown by asserting a strict liability failure to warn cause of action. See infra note 68
and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the failure to warn "defect" and its effect
on the application of comment k).
79. Since virtually all California non-drug failure to warn cases analyze that defect under
the rubric of negligence, there should be no theoretical distinction between prescription drugs
and OTC products, regardless of whether comment k is extended into the OTC arena. Cf.
Rodriguez v. Superior Court, -Cal. App. 3d - , 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7611 (to be
reported at 271 Cal. Rptr. 114 (July 2, 1990); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
217 Cal. App. 3d 772, 266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1990), petition for review granted and opinion
superseded, 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74. See supra note 27 and cases cited therein
(discussing California failure to warn doctrine).
80. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8; Schwartz, supra note 64; Page, supra note 15;
McClellan, supra note 12; Willig, The Comment k Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict
Liability, 29 MERCER L. Rav. 545 (1978).
81. See generally Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412 (1988).
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k protection should be extended to OTC products appears to be an
open question.
In fact, support for the application of comment k to OTC medi-
cations can be gleaned from language which suggests that unavoidably
unsafe products are "especially common in the field of drugs.' '82
The comment observes that such products are not defective or
unreasonably dangerous and cites as specific examples "[d]rugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason can not
legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a
physician." ' 83 That Dean Prosser, in drafting the language of comment
k, did not intend to limit the comment's ambit to prescription drugs,
is borne out by statements he made during debate over an initial
draft of section 402A at a meeting of the American Law Institute's
section on the Restatement of Torts in 1961. Specifically, Prosser
was concerned that proposed amendments to section 402A, which
would have explicitly exempted all prescription drugs, would inap-
propriately leave the task of determining those products to be pro-
tected from strict liability to what he perceived as a non-uniform
and sometimes illogical regulatory scheme. 84 While some commenta-
tors have suggested that rejection of the amendments by the A.L.I.
evidenced the A.L.I.'s intention not to provide blanket protection
for prescription drugs, 85 the conclusion which is best supported by
Dean Prosser's testimony, as well as the other language which he
drafted into comment k, is that the scope of comment k was intended
to cover all prescription drugs as well as at least some non-prescrip-
tion medications. 86 To the extent that the language of comment k is
unclear as to its scope, this ambiguity is largely explained by the
lack of knowledge on the part of Dean Prosser and the drafters of
82. See supra note 29 (providing the language of comment k).
83. Id.
84. Prosser's comments were in response to two proposed amendments to section 402A
submitted by another member of the Committee on Torts. A.L.I. Proc. (1961), at 90-92. While
Prosser was sympathetic to the policy underlying the proposed amendments, the late Dean
expressed some difficulty with the definition of "drug" and the limitations of the amendments
to prescription products. He observed: "I am not happy about the limitation of prescription.
It seems to me that what you are doing is tossing it back to a lot of local regulations which
vary enormously and frequently do not make any sense." Id. at 95-96.
85. Comment, supra note 8 at 722; Humphreys, supra note 8, at 1274.
86. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1145-46. Professor Page, whose interpretation of comment
k was cited with approval by the supreme court in Brown, has noted that the comment "[m]ay
be read to remove from the reach of section 402A any product that is unavoidably unsafe as
long as the manufacturer will not be subject to liability under a negligence rule for injury
caused by the product. Such an exemption includes but is not limited to prescription drugs
... ." Page, supra note 15, at 867.
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the Restatement regarding the regulatory distinction between prescrip-
tion and non-prescription medications.8 7 To his credit, Prosser refused
to promote any definitive line-drawing in the pharmaceutical area,
presumably leaving that task to further common law developments
in pharmaceutical product litigation.
2. Application of the Brown Policy to Over-the-Counter Drugs
In holding that comment k should apply to all prescription medi-
cations, the Brown court emphasized the need to encourage research
and development of affordable drugs and to protect the marketing
of existing products from the deterrent effect of strict liability. Any
future limitation or extension of the comment k doctrine to OTC
drugs should ultimately turn on the supreme court's policy analysis
in Brown.
Three significant themes appear to form the basis for the categor-
ical application of comment k to prescription drug products in Brown:
(1) The products, while inherently unsafe, confer great social benefit,8
(2) the products are subject to intense regulation by the federal
government, 89 and (3) the industry which manufactures the products
is particularly susceptible to the effects of liability in terms of
research, development, and marketing decisions. 90
To preclude protection for OTC drugs under the Bron analysis,
a court would have to conclude that: (1) OTC drugs,' by definition,
are not sufficiently beneficial, (2) such products are not subject to
equivalent federal scrutiny, and (3) the OTC drug industry is not
uniquely affected by the imposition of strict liability. However, an
analysis of the origin, regulation, and social impact of OTC drugs
demonstrates that all three of the considerations in Brown apply to
non-prescription medications.
87. Page, supra note 15, at 866 n.66. Indeed, the A.L.I. Proceedings between 1961 and
1964 were devoid of any detailed analysis of the federal regulatory process.
88. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1063, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 420 (1988). It is important to note that the court assessed the benefits of prescription
drugs as a "class", and refused to engage in ad hoc determinations of whether a particular
drug is, in isolation, in fact beneficial to the public health. Id. at 1065 n.10, 751 P.2d at 480
n.10, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421 n.10.
89. Id. at 1069 n.12, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.12.
90. Id. at 1063-1065, 751 P.2d at 478-80, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420-21.
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a. OTC or Prescription Classification? The Role of Drug
Benefit
According to the California Supreme Court, a significant difference
between prescription drugs and other consumer goods, such as ma-
chinery, is that the non-drug goods are used "to make work easier
or to provide pleasure," while drugs may be necessary "to alleviate
pain and suffering or to sustain life." 91 In order for a rational
distinction to be drawn between OTC and prescription products in
the context of the application of strict liability, it must be demon-
strated that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) distinguishes
between the two classes on the basis of the benefits the products
provide. By this classification, the prescription drugs would be the
more beneficial drugs (i.e., those which alleviate pain and suffering
or which sustain life) and OTC drugs would be the less beneficial
drugs (i.e., those which provide only minor comfort). If the FDA
does not classify drugs in this manner, the regulatory distinction
between prescription and over-the-counter medications cannot logi-
cally serve as a basis for determining which products are deserving
of comment k protection.
Under the current statutory and regulatory scheme, the federal
government, through the FDA, engages in a generalized risk-benefit
examination of all new drugs as a condition to marketing, regardless
of their prescription or OTC status.9 2 As Professor James O'Reilly
noted:
The judgment of marketability made by both the manufacturer and
the Food and Drug Administration for a drug product takes into
account the benefits of the product and the relative risk presented
91. Id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. As noted earlier, while there
may be other non-drug products which confer the same type of benefit, they would not be
protected by comment k unless they were shown to be unavoidably unsafe. Id. For example,
contaminated blood may fall within the *ambit of comment k. See Miles Laboratories v. Doe,
315 Md. 704, 556 A.2d 1107 (1989); Belle Bonfills Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d
118 (Colo. 1983).
92. Indeed, all new drugs are presumed to be destined for the OTC market. Their status
when ultimately marketed will turn on; (1) whether the manufacturer desires to distribute the
drug over-the-counter, and (2) whether FDA approves of such intention. O'Reilly, The Food
and Drug Administration, (Regulatory Manual Series), v.2, 1989, at 14-9. See Initial Decision,
Benylin Expectorant, Docket 76N-0483 (FDA 1979), and Parke-Davis & Co. v. Califano, 564
F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
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in light of other available remedies and the particular therapeutic
situation to which the drug is addressed. 93
Such an assessment by the FDA, in the context of prescription drugs,
partly formed the foundation for the Brown court's application of
comment k to those products, although it is clear that the same
analysis is utilized by the FDA in determining the risks and benefits
of OTC medications.
After conducting a risk-benefit assessment, the FDA determines if
the drug should be marketed to the consumer or to the physician.
This secondary examination focuses on whether the medication, or
the underlying condition which necessitates the drug, requires medical
supervision. The FDA determines whether written directions for the
drug's use will be adequate and understandable by the lay consumer.94
This distinction of whether the consumer can understand the drug's
directions is the most critical and fundamental distinction between
prescription and OTC drugs. This distinction does not bear directly
on drug benefits, since all drugs must demonstrate efficacy in treating
or preventing the conditions for which they are indicated.
i. The Historical Origins of the Prescription/OTC Distinction
A historical analysis of the regulatory framework demonstrates
that the classification of a drug as "prescription" or "over-the-
counter" was never based on an assessment of medical import."
Prior to 1938, there was no distinction between prescription and
OTC medications, with the exception of certain habit-forming nar-
cotics.96 In 1938, Congress passed sweeping legislation in the form
93. O'Reilly, The Food and Drug Administration, (Regulatory Manual Series), v.2, 1979,
at 14-7.
94. Willig, supra note 80, at 557. Dr. John Archer noted that the distinction between
OTC and prescription drugs involves a labeling decision. Archer, Instrument Or Impediment?
The Regulatory Monograph In Medical Communications, 120 J. A.M.A. 1474, 1474-75 (1972).
If the directions can be written for a lay person, the drug is marketed OTC. Id.
95. In reviewing the historical development of the regulatory distinction between OTC
and prescription drugs, one commentator was moved to quip:
I am not certain whether to analogize this distinction to Pallas Athena who sprang
full-grown from Zeus' head or to Topsy, who "just growed." In any event, it was
only shortly after the enactment of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
that any general distinction was drawn under federal law concerning the dispensing
status of a drug product.
Kaplan, Over-The-Counter And Prescription Drugs: The Legal Distinction Under Federal Law,
37 FooD DRUG Cosix. L.J. 441, 441 (1982)
96. The 1906 Food and Drugs Act was the first comprehensive federal law regulating
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of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (Act),97 which was largely
designed to broaden FDA powers to ensure product safety. Whereas
previous federal law subjected manufacturers to regulatory scrutiny
only for the "fraudulent misbranding" of their products, 9 the new
Act provided that any "new drug" must be tested for safety and
approved by FDA prior to marketing.9 The "new drug" definition
drew no distinction between products for sale over-the-counter or by
prescription. This was a logical outcome since most drugs were sold
directly to consumers at the time of the Act.' ° In addition to
providing for a pre-market safety screen, the Act required warnings
and adequate directions for use on drug product labels, unless the
FDA determined that such labeling was unnecessary. 10'
The new Act itself did not specifically create separate drug cate-
gories. However, shortly after the Act's passage, internal debate at
the FDA regarding how the agency should enforce the new legislation
resulted in the first prescription/OTC distinction. 0 2 Some FDA re-
gulators felt that the new labeling requirements of the Act created a
potential conflict with related provisions.0 3 Specifically, they felt that
adequate warnings and directions for use intended for lay consumers
could not be written for some drugs.' °4 Since the Act deemed any
drug which failed to provide adequate labeling to be "misbranded,"
drugs. 1906 Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 STAT. 768, as amended. This law was designed
to curtail fraudulent claims made by patent medicine distributors. The 1914 Harrison Narcotic
Act required that opium and coca leaf derivatives be dispensed only upon a physician's written
order, although the number of refills was unregulated. 38 STAT. 785 (1914)
97. 2 STAT. 1040 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-392 (West Supp. 1990).
98. See infra note 101.
99. 2 STAT. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982). New drugs are defined as those
products which have the following characteristics: (1) Classification as a drug; (2) absence of
general recognition of safety and effectiveness for the drug, a recognition of those attributes
among qualified scientists rather than among the public or all practitioners, or absence of
such general recognition as to any particular use for which it is proposed to be used and
prescribed; and (3) absence of a record of pre-1938 uses for that drug which match identically
the uses for which the drug is now represented to be useful. Id. § 355(a)-(b).
100. Indeed, it appears that the intent of Congress in passing the Act was to improve and
facilitate self-medication by safeguarding the consumer through pre-market clearance and more
detailed labeling. Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J. oF L. & ECON.
91, 96 (1979).
101. The United States Code provides that a drug is "misbranded" unless its label provides
the user with adequate directions and adequate warnings. 21 U.S.C. 352(f) (1982). The directions
and warnings must be in a manner and form that will protect the users. Id. The Sec. of
Health, Ed. & Welfare may exempt any drug from the directions and warnings requirement
if the Secretary finds the directions and warnings unnecessary to protect the consumers. Id.
102. See Kaplan, supra note 95, at 441-42.
103. See Temin, supra note 100, at 99.
104. Id. at 96-100.
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the FDA was concerned that some beneficial medicines might have
to be taken off the market. 05
In order to provide protection for the manufacturers of these as
yet unidentified drugs, the FDA promulgated regulations which ex-
empted from the labeling requirements of the Act, any drug which
bore the legend: "Caution: To be used only by or on the prescription
of a physician."' 1  There was no explicit articulation of which drugs
were incapable of being properly labeled. The FDA left the decision
up to individual manufacturers.
Between 1938 and 1951, there was little uniformity in the classi-
fication of drug products as either prescription or OTC. Indeed,
many drugs were sold by prescription only by some manufacturers,
with other companies selling an identical drug over-the-counter, the
only difference being in the content of the label. Congressional
response to this inconsistency, developed largely in order to protect
pharmacists, came in the form of the 1951 Humphrey-Durham
Amendments to the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938.107 The
amendments outlined for the first time the definitional criteria which
FDA was to use in determining prescription drug status, although
the new law left the determination of who could prescribe such
products up to the individual states.10
In the wake of the thalidomide disaster, the next significant drug
legislation was the 1962 amendment to the 1938 Act which added,
in addition to pre-existing safety regulations, a requirement that all
"new drugs" demonstrate substantial evidence of efficacy in the
context of their indications for use.'09 The 1962 legislation imposed
105. Id. Professor Temin concludes that FDA rule-making in this respect was contrary to
the intent of Congress, which was to encourage the availability of safe drugs without a
prescription. Id. at 96.
106. 3 Fed. Reg. 3168 (Dec. 28, 1938).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1976).
108. As the FDA noted: "The prescription requirements were enacted for the sake of
uniformity of labeling and the protection of retail druggists ... not [as] a result of a
congressional decision that the government rather than the manufacturers was best able to
determine which drugs were most appropriately marketed on a prescription basis ..... " Initial
decision, Docket No. 76N-0483, In Matter of Benylin Expectorant: Proposal to Deny Approval
of Supplemental New Drug Application at 6-7 (May 31, 1978).
109. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 6 Stat. 780 (1962) (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.). As was
the case when the 1938 Act was enacted to require premarket "safety" testing, the 1962
amendments imposed an efficacy requirement on all "new drugs," including those destined
for the OTC market. Under the OTC Review regulations, efficacy is defined as follows:
Effectiveness means a reasonable expectation that, in a significant proportion of the
target population, the pharmacological effect of the drug, when used under adequate
directions for use and warnings against unsafe use, will provide clinically significant
relief of the type claimed.
21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(ii) (1990).
1990 / Comment k
a requirement that drugs demonstrate actual medical benefit, in
addition to safety, as a prerequisite for marketing approval. Previ-
ously, neither prescription products nor over-the-counter drugs were
required to prove efficacy. The new efficacy-testing regulations sim-
ilarly failed to draw a distinction between OTC and prescription
medications.
Thus, the current regulatory scheme implements a two-tiered ap-
proach to pharmaceutical approval and marketing. Prior to FDA
approval, manufacturers must submit well-controlled studies dem-
onstrating both safety and efficacy. Only after these studies have
been completed and reviewed by the FDA is a secondary decision
made concerning how a particular product will be marketed. 110 Cer-
tainly, this secondary analysis indirectly involves drug risks and
benefits, but only to the extent that those factors impact the ability
of lay consumers to use a drug safely and effectively without medical
supervision. It is the medical supervision issue which has ultimately
determined the overall makeup of the over-the-counter drug market-
place.
ii. The Parameters of the OTC Marketplace
Since 1951 the primary impact of the Humphrey-Durham Amend-
ments has been to enhance uniformity in the marketing classification
of identical drug products. The effect of the amendments has not
been to create dichotomous categories of medicinal products on the
basis of relative social import since the criteria which control the
prescription definition turn on the need for medical supervision,
rather than the risk-benefit profile of a chemotherapeutic agent.
Moreover, the prescription drug criteria contained in the 1951
amendments were not intended to constitute a "static" definition,
but are ideally applied consistent with the evolution of social, eco-
110. Of course, some drugs may be principally targeted for either prescription or OTC
status early in their development. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 93, § 13.10. Additionally,
any question about safety during the NDA process may lead to an accelerated decision that
prescription distribution is required. Id. § 13.09, at 13-51. Once the FDA determines that a
drug requires a prescription, over manufacturer objection, judicial review may be taken under
21 United States Code section 505. See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S.
645 (1973). In general, however, courts are likely to defer to the expertise of the agency. See
National Nutritional Foods Association v. Matthews, 423 U.S. 827 (1975), dismissed on remand,
418 F. Supp. 394 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), revd. and remanded, 557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977).
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nomic, and scientific data."' The FDA's implementation of the
prescription drug criteria largely reflects this policy of flexibility,
although the agency has been criticized for individual decisions which
have occasionally been inconsistent or arbitrary.1 2
The fact that a particular drug is "toxic" or "may lead to harmful
results" does not mean that the drug will automatically be restricted
to prescription status .113 Virtually all drugs can have harmful effects
on susceptible individuals, even when used according to directions." 4
Nevertheless, if those risks can be adequately disseminated via prod-
uct labeling to consumers, OTC status may be justified. Even drugs
with especially significant potential risks may be marketed OTC where
the benefits largely outweigh the costs of restricted access." 5
Similarly, the "collateral measures"" 6 and "medical diagnosis"' "7
criteria of the 1951 amendments have not been uniformly applied.
Insulin (diabetes), antacids (ulcers), and inhalation bronchodilators
(asthma) are all highly beneficial products which are used to treat
conditions which require an initial medical diagnosis and subsequent
monitoring, yet all these drugs are, to a large extent, available over-
the-counter."'8
Several other important categories of pharmaceutical products un-
derscore the lack of substantive differences between many OTC and
prescription drugs, and demonstrate why comment k, and the Brown
policy to encourage expanded availability of such products, cannot
be rationally limited to prescription medications. A multitude of OTC
11. Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs From Prescrip-
tion to NonPrescription Status, 37 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 427, 433 (1982). Such information
may include new information regarding a drug's toxicity. For example, the antibacterial agent
hexachlorophene was switched from OTC to prescription status after reports of neurological
toxicity. Baumgartner, A Historical Examination of the FDA's Review of The Safety and
Effectiveness of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 43 FOOD DRuG Cosm. L.J. 463, 475 (1988).
112. Pinco & Cogan, Prescription to Over-the-Counter Switches: An Example of the New
Procedures In the Post-Monograph Era, 39 FOOD DRuG Cosm. L.J. 230, 234-35 (1984).
113. Hutt, supra note 111, at 434.
114. Note, Picking Your Poison: The Drug Efficacy Requirement And The Right Of
Privacy, 25 UCLA L. R-v. 577, 585-86 (1978). See also Hess & Clark Division of Rhodia,
Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
115. Rachanow, The Switch of Drugs From Prescription To Over-the-Counter Status, 39
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 201, 205 (1984). A good example involves common aspirin. That drug
is associated with development of Reyes Syndrome, a rare, but often fatal disease afflicting
children. Nevertheless, FDA has rejected proposals to restrict children's aspirin sales to a
doctor's prescription, concluding that information regarding the potential risk can be adequately
disseminated in product labeling. 53 Fed. Reg. 21633, 21635 (1988).
116. See supra note 111.
117. See id.
118. Wuest & Gossel, How-And Why-Prescription Drugs Become OTC, U.S. PnARMNA-
cisT, (September, 1982) at 23.
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drugs are prescribed by physicians in this country on a daily basis. 19
Drawing a liability distinction between cases where an OTC product
was "prescribed" by a physician and where the same drug was self-
administered to treat the same illness by a more sophisticated and
cost-conscious consumer would be difficult to justify.
Many products have been put into a special category by the FDA
because of their potential for misuse. 120 This is especially true of
some medications which contain codeine, a potent cough suppressant.
Such products may be sold over-the-counter at the discretion of the
individual states.12 ' Were comment k restricted to prescription drugs,
the application of strict liability to these medications would depend
exclusively on venue, a result which, as the court in Brown noted,
would circumvent the comment's underlying policy.' 22
A significant number of medications are sold both over-the-counter
and by prescription, although each OTC product is identical in terms
of ingredients, dosage and strength to its prescription counterpart.
Here the FDA distinction is based on a difference in indications for
use. For example, the drug meclizine is used to treat vertigo as well
as nausea accompanying motion sickness. One version of the drug,
Bonnine, is sold OTC and is indicated for motion sickness. The same
drug (manufactured by the same company) is marketed in a prescrip-
tion form knqwn as Antivert. The reason: Bonnine is indicated for
vertigo, which requires, according to FDA, a medical diagnosis.1 23
Again, this dichotomy bears no relation to either the risks or benefits
of a drug per se, and points to the difficulty in limiting comment k
protection to prescription drugs.
The OTC category with the most to win or lose in a debate over
the extension of Brown to non-prescription drugs includes those
products which have been reclassified by the FDA from prescription
to OTC status. These products are referred to by the FDA and the
119. Liebowitz, Substitution Between Prescribed and Over-the-Counter Medications, 27
MEDICAL CARE 85, 93 (1989). "National data indicate that physicians routinely suggest OTC
drugs during office visits; aspirin ranks sixth among the drugs most frequently ordered or
provided in office practice." Id.
120. 21 U.S.C.A § 812 (West 1990).
121. These so-called schedule products include preparations with up to one grain per ounce
of codeine. See id. § 812(c).
122. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Kearl mini-trial).
123. Wuest & Gossel, supra note 118, at 23. In recent years, there has been a clear trend
at the FDA towards liberalizing the agency's policy to allow more simultaneous OTC/
prescription marketing of identical products for different indications. Some likely candidates
for the future include climetidine, sucralfate, and clotrimazole. F-D-C Reports, Pink Sheet,
August 8, 1988 at 3.
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pharmaceutical industry as "switch-overs." 1 24 They include former
prescription products which have been moved entirely from prescrip-
tion to OTC status, as well as low-dose versions of prescription
chemicals. 125
Perhaps the best example of an OTC switch-over, for the purposes
of this article, is the drug hydrocortisone. Hydrocortisone is used to
treat many dermatologic disorders and is now sold over-the-counter
in concentrations up to .5 percent. 126 Hydrocortisone is significant in
that it was specifically cited by the California Supreme Court in
Brown as an example of a product with unquestionable and signifi-
cant social value and as a justification for exempting "prescription
drugs" from strict liability. 27
As of January, 1989, the FDA switched over more than forty-
three prescription ingredients and dosages to OTC status. 2 A more
sophisticated public is demanding that the FDA consider more OTC
switch-overs. 29 The trend has led one observer to suggest that:
[T]here is virtually no limit to the number of prescription drugs
that are potential candidates for transfer to non-prescription status.
By far the three most important considerations involved are the
margin of safety, the abuse potential, and the availability of ade-
quate labeling. The considerations of self-diagnosis and self-treat-
ment are waning in importance, and indeed are already of minor
significance. Social policy concerns may well regulate the speed at
which transfers are made from prescription to non-prescription
124. See generally Cusick & Downs, The Prescription to Over-the-Counter Switch, A.IaER-
ICAN DRUGGIST, June 1986 at 101-13.
125. A "switch-over" can be accomplished through a number of procedural mechanisms
and can be initiated both by FDA and industry or upon the petition of "any interested
person."
126. F-D-C Reports, Pink Sheet, March 5, 1990 at 1. Additional concentrations up to one
percent have been tentatively cleared for OTC switch-over by FDA and are likely to be
introduced sometime in 1991. Id at 90-91.
127. Brown-v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 420 (1988). The Brown reference takes on added significance since it in turn cited Dean
Prosser who concluded in a famous quote: "The argument that industries producing potentially
dangerous products should make good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add
the cost to the price of the product, encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two
of the greatest medical boons to the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their
dangerous side effects, and that drug companies might well have been deterred from producing
and selling them." Id. (citing PROSSER, TORTS § 99 at 661 (4th Ed. 1971)). It should be noted
that Dean Prosser's other example, penicillin, has been, and continues to be, a candidate for
switch-over, at least at low dose levels. See Temin, Costs and Benefits In Switching Drugs
From Rx to OTC, 2 J. OF HEALTH EcoN. 187, 199-201 (1987).
128. Proprietary Association data (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
129. A recent industry survey revealed that 24 pharmaceutical firms which responded to
the survey will make 170 submissions to the FDA in the next four years, of which 57 will be
switch-over requests. Soller, Introduction, 24 DRUG INFO. J. 1, 1-2 (1990).
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status, but ultimately can be expected to reinforce that process. 130
Every drug, regardless of this marketing status, has a unique risk-
benefit profile. Some OTC products have enormous benefit but
relatively few risks and this largely justifies their direct sale to
consumers. Some prescription drugs on the other hand, have less
qualitative or quantitative benefit than their OTC cousins, but may
involve significantly greater risks or are indicated for more complex
pathologies necessitating medical supervision and thus prescription
status. In both cases however, the marketing classification distinction
does not directly turn on drug benefits. Indeed, even the risk factor
is playing a less important role in marketing decisions as demand
for over-the-counter medications increases. The clear trend is towards
OTC distribution of increasingly potent, and thus inherently danger-
ous, chemicals.
b. FDA Regulation of OTC Drugs: Proof of Safety and
Efficacy
Along with the general belief that there is a significant difference
in the risks and benefits of prescription and OTC medications is the
common misperception among lay persons that OTC drugs are not
subjected to the kind of rigorous governmental scrutiny imposed on
the manufacturers of prescription products.' Obviously, this concern
is unfounded with respect to "dual category" or "switch-over" drugs
since these products, by virtue of their current or former prescription
status, have already been subjected to the approval process for that
classification. Moreover, all "new" drugs developed for the OTC
market are screened according to the same criteria and protocol for
approval applicable to prescription medications. 32
130. Hutt, supra note 111, at 440. It is anticipated that by 1995 newly switched prescription
products will consume 24 percent of the OTC analgesic market. Some potential switch
candidates which have both significant risks as well as benefits include naproxen, diflusinal,
piroxicam, and fenoprofen. F-D-C Reports, Pink Sheet, March 12, 1990 at 13.
131. The United States drug regulatory scheme has been called the "most stringent" in
the world. O'Reilly, supra note 93, at 13-7, 13-8. Indeed, pre-market testing protocols are so
time-consuming and expensive that they, in addition to liability concerns, often delay drug
introduction until years after identical products are marketed in other countries. See generally
VARDELL, 24 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND Ti RAPaEurics 499 (1978); PELTZMAN, THt BENEFITs
AND COSTs OF NEw DRUG REGULATION, (R. Landau, Ed. 1973).
132. All new drugs, which by definition include reformulations of old products, as well as
existing drugs with new indications, are subject to FDA approval via the New Drug Application
(NDA) process which requires manufacturers to submit to the agency extensive toxicologic and
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c. The Impact of Strict Liability on the OTC Drug Industry
In light of the similar benefits and regulations of OTC drugs, a
court must determine whether imposing strict liability will adversely
affect the OTC drug industry. As the court in Brown concluded,
strict liability may negatively deter a manufacturer from allocating
money to research and develop new chemotherapeutic agents.'33 The
impact of such liability on the drug industry, insofar as it relates to
"new drugs," should affect OTC and prescription products equally
since the ultimate marketing status of a drug may not be determined
until the end of the New Drug Application process. Accordingly, the
Brown policy of encouraging research and development by exempting
prescription drugs should apply to all new products including those
slated for over-the-counter distribution.
efficacy data accumulated as a result of animal and clinical studies. See generally O'Reilly,
supra note 93, at §§ 13.03, 13.11. All drugs introduced subsequent to implementation of the
1938 Act were required to have FDA approval through the NDA process on the basis of well-
controlled clinical data demonstrating safety. The 1962 amendments added an efficacy require-
ment so that drugs introduced subsequent to that date must establish both safety and efficacy
in their NDA. Prescription drugs introduced between 1938 and 1962, which had only been
tested for safety, were re-examined for efficacy by scientific panels designated by the National
Academy of Sciences through a process known as the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation
(DESI) Review. See generally id. § 13.07. Given the enormous number of OTC products on
the market in 1962 (estimated to be around 500,000), but with the knowledge that the active
ingredients contained in those products was relatively small (between 300 and 700), the FDA
instituted a similar, but separate examination of all OTC active ingredients known as the OTC
Review. Pursuant to the review, all OTC ingredients on the market prior to 1972 have been
evaluated by scientific panels drawing their membership primarily from relevant areas of
academic expertise which review the world's literature as well as data submitted by manufac-
turers. These panels are designated according to product category and the results of their
review are ultimately formulated into a written monograph which determines; (1) a drug's
safety, (2) drug efficacy for particular indications, and (3) appropriate labeling. As a function
of the review process, an OTC ingredient may be found to be safe and effective for a particular
indication (Class I) or lacking in one or both of those elements (Class II) and thus subject to
removal from the OTC market by the FDA. See generally id. § 13.08; Harlow, The FDA's
OTC Drug Review: The Development and an Analysis of Some Aspects of the Procedure, 32
FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 248 (1977). The OTC review process is largely complete and the
remaining product monographs are likely to be finalized by the end of 1991.
133. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1063, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 420 (1988). A recent study undertaken by the Center for the Study of Drug Development
at Tufts University demonstrates how risky investment in pharmaceutical innovation can be.
Analogizing drug development to the oil industry, the investigators noted that drug research
and development will inevitably encounter "more dry holes than wet holes. The fate of a
project cannot be known with certainty at the outset." The study estimates that, on average,
new chemical entity (NCE) research and development takes twelve years from synthesis of a
compound to marketing approval and costs $231 million in 1987 dollars. Even more significant
is the fact that the average success rate for drug companies ultimately gaining FDA approval
is a scant 23 percent. Remarks of Joseph A. Diamasi, Ph.D. (pre-publication press release
April 19, 1990) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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A second critical consideration is whether imposing strict liability
affects the range and affordability of products. Given the present
regulatory scheme, the answer is definitely in the affirmative. 3 4 FDA
switch-over decisions are a low priority and tend to be made on an
ad hoc basis. a5 The FDA has yet to articulate a definitive switch-
over policy relating to all drugs. 3 6 Accordingly, a great deal of
uncertainty already exists in the pharmaceutical industry, making
manufacturer commitment of the significant resources needed to
effectuate switch approval an inherently risky business. 3 7
Given an already uncertain regulatory climate, the potential effect
of liability incurred as a result of an OTC switch has become a
critical factor for the industry to consider.' As long as the nature
of most OTC drug-related injuries remains relatively innocuous, at
least when compared to prescription drugs, specific examples of
manufacturers withdrawing products from the market in the face of
increasing liability may not be readily apparent. However, this should
not lead courts to conclude that since incidents do not exist, since
imposition of strict liability is more likely to affect a manufacturer's
decision to market a drug over-the-counter rather than by encouraging
outright product removal. Thus, the damage to the public interest in
imposing strict liability on OTC manufacturers may ultimately be
manifested by restriction in the availability of affordable new prod-
ucts for self-medication. 39
Undoubtedly, the strict liability factor will drastically increase in
significance as consumer demand for more potent forms of self-
134. A recent study concluded: "Recent experience indicates that pharmaceutical innovation
is sensitive to risk. The increased risk of financial losses created by lawsuits has already slowed
innovation in the areas of vaccines and contraceptives. Only one major pharmaceutical firm
is conducting R&D on new contraceptives." National Pharmaceutical Council Report: Phar-
maceutical Research: Therapeutic and Economic Value of Incremental Improvements, 39 (1990).
There is little reason to believe that the imposition of strict liability will have any different
effect on the over-the-counter drug industry. This is especially true given the fact that many
companies which market vaccines and contraceptives also market over-the-counter drugs.
135. Pinco & Cogan, supra note 112, at 234. For a brief history of the FDA's treatment
of switch-overs, see generally Pinco, A Legal Perspective on Regulatory Approaches to Switch,
24 DRUG I'FO. J. 5, 5-10 (1990).
136. See Pinco & Cogan, supra note 112, at 234.
137. O'Reilly, The State of GRACE: God Only Knows the Future of Over-the-Counter
Drug Regulation, I REGULATORY AFFAIRs 239, 242 (1989).
138. See id. at 244; Hutt, supra note 111, at 439.
139. Not only does greater access to OTC drugs reduce medical costs by decreasing the
amount of physician visits, the actual cost of OTC switch-over products is normally far below
the price of identical prescription drugs because of wider distribution and more direct com-
petition. O'Reilly, supra note 137, at 240. Both cost and availability were important factors
in the Brown analysis. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
rationale of Brown).
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medication grows in the face of increased buyer sophistication,
spiraling costs of primary health care, and the lack of comprehensive
health insurance.140
In sum, a tort compensation system which refuses to extend
comment k protection in cases involving non-prescription drugs can-
not be justified based on the language contained in the Restatement.
Moreover, for the policies underlying the comment to be fully im-
plemented, the judiciary must avoid conditioning comment k appli-
cation on common misperceptions regarding the nature of OTC and
prescription drugs.
B. The "Limited Exemption" Approach
Since the OTC drug classification encompasses a significant range
of products from insulin to cough drops, a court considering appli-
cation of comment k may choose to extend the Brown analysis to
some, but not all OTC medications. However, any interpretation of
the comment's scope which fails to cover all OTC drug products is
liable to suffer from the same analytical inconsistencies and inade-
quacies which beset the Kearl "mini-trial" approach; a standard
which was rejected by the court in Brown. First, courts will be unable
to effectively formulate a bright line test which can rationally exempt
some OTC drugs from strict liability while excluding others from
such protection. The changing nature of drug products, e.g., switch-
over and dual category drugs, and the inherent difficulty in making
extra-regulatory assessments of individual product benefits, precludes
adoption of a fixed rule governing ad hoc application of comment
k to OTC products. Second, the policy of promoting research and
development would be ill-served by such an approach because a
manufacturer must decide to allocate research and development funds
before a new chemical entity is classified by the FDA.
1. Regulatory Line-Drawing
Courts wishing to maintain a semblance of the status quo while
providing comment k protection to some OTC products could limit
the application of comment k to medications with the same charac-
140. Hutt, supra note 111, at 439.
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teristics as prescription drugs. Courts could protect any drug which
was "prescribed" by a doctor, even if the product is available over-
the-counter; for example, aspirin prescribed for patients at high risk
for stroke. However, such a limitation would be inappropriately
based on the assumption that a "learned intermediary" is a necessary
prerequisite for the comment k exemption. 141 Such a limitation would
also penalize a manufacturer for making a drug available for use by
more sophisticated consumers who self-medicate as an alternative to
seeing a doctor. Finally, such a limitation fails to take into account
the major use for most OTC products: the treatment of symptoms
which are readily recognizable by consumers, even if their underlying
medical causes are not. 142
Courts might also consider limiting comment k protection to OTC
ingredients which are also sold in prescription form or as part of a
prescription compound (dual category drugs). 43 Along the same lines,
courts could extend the exemption to OTC "switch-overs" based on
their history of prescription status. Limiting protection to "dual
category" products or "switch-overs" is unsatisfactory because it
assumes that over-the-counter drugs without a prescription counter-
part or historical prescription status do not deserve exemption from
strict liability. In fact, most OTC ingredients, including some of the
most beneficial drugs in our therapeutic arsenal, were marketed prior
to 1938 when the initial prescription/OTC distinction was developed
by the FDA.144 More importantly, this approach will not provide
protection for new drugs developed specifically for the OTC market
in an age of increasing consumer demand for such products. 45
141. It is the law in California as well as most other jurisdictions that, as a general matter,
the manufacturer of a prescription drug is under a duty only to disseminate warnings to
prescribing physicians, who act as "learned intermediaries" by passing along to their patients
information they believe is necessary for safe and effective use. See e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz,
17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971). However, the input of a "learned intermediary"
is not always apparent even in prescription drug cases. Indeed, two of the most widely litigated
prescription drug products, vaccines and oral contraceptives, normally involve little physician
input, and as a result, manufacturers of these products may be under a duty to disseminate
warnings to patients themselves. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1974) (vaccine case); Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (D.C.
Mich. 1985) (oral contraceptive case). See generally Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Pre-
scription Drugs, And Patient Information, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 633 (1986).
142. Rachanow, supra note 115, at 205-6.
143. For example, there are many OTC analgesic ingredients which are combined with
narcotics to form prescription compounds, including aspirin and acetaminophen with codeine.
144. McLeod, Non-Prescription Drug Approval: Therapeutic Strategy or Marketing Deci-
sion?, 23 THE ANNALs oF PHAsmAcoTHEss'PY 607 (1989). A prominent example is insulin.
145. It is conceivable that a drug might be developed with certain known or unknown
risks but with a benefit side which justifies immediate OTC marketing. Many such products
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2. Case-By-Case Determination
A second possible approach to non-prescription drug liability would
involve examining individual OTC drug benefits on a case-by-case
basis. A number of jurisdictions outside of California established the
theoretical basis for this case-by-case analysis.146 Specifically, several
decisions which have rejected blanket protection of prescription drugs
in favor of a Kearl analysis probably do not deny comment k
protection for at least some OTC drugs, since these cases candidly
admit that there are non-prescription medications whose benefits
would arguably meet the criteria for comment k inclusion articulated
by the court in Brown.
Under an ad hoc approach, courts could attempt to limit comment
k protection to OTC products whose medicinal benefits are readily
apparent, such as analgesics, while allowing a strict liability design
defect analysis to apply in cases involving seemingly less important
preparations, such as wart removers and foot powders. However, as
is the case for virtually all prescription drugs, it is likely that even
these latter products would ultimately receive comment k protection
once a judge or jury closely examined their risk-benefit profiles. 47
Despite the relative ease with which prescription drug manufactur-
ers have prevailed on the comment k issue in jurisdictions employing
the ad hoc approach, the supreme court in Brown rejected any form
of risk-benefit balancing as a prerequisite to exemption from strict
design defect liability. 48 The Brown court observed that the very
process of making a medical and legal distinction between avoidably
are currently in the developmental pipeline in the diagnostic field, including self-test kits for
AIDS.
146. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); White v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E.2d 748 (1988). White expressly extended its holding
to prescription drugs, vaccines or similar products. White, 533 N.E.2d at 752. The Hill court
noted that non-prescription drug products create a similar benefit to society. Hill, 884 F.2d at
1069 n.8. It is interesting that in their attempt to limit the application of comment k by
rejecting an across-the-board exemption for prescription drugs, these cases, from a theoretical
standpoint, arguably go beyond the holding in Brown.
147. Empirically, few, if any, prescription drugs fail to garner comment k protection in
jurisdictions employing an ad hoc risk-benefit balancing test. See Comment, supra note 8, at
731. But see Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1981). If indirect
benefits from an OTC drug are presented to the jury, such as affordability and effects on
health care availability and insurance rates, the likelihood of comment k protection from
seemingly innocuous non-prescription drugs may be significantly increased.
148. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1067, 751 P.2d 470, 481, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 423 (1988).
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and unavoidably unsafe medications would substantially impair the
public interest in the development and marketing of chemotherapeutic
agents. 149
The Brown court's analysis and ultimate rejection of the ad hoc
approach stemmed directly from the social policy underlying comment
k. The court interpreted the comment as exempting classes of prod-
ucts from a strict design defect standard where the policies advanced
by imposition of such liability are outweighed by its potentially
deleterious effect on competing social goals.'50 In the context of the
class of pharmaceutical products, these competing social goals in-
clude: (1) maintenance of currently available prescription drugs, (2)
encouragement of resource allocation towards the development of
new medications, and (3) increased affordability of drug products.
From a liability standpoint, facilitation of these three goals, and thus
the effectiveness of comment k itself, turns largely upon one over-
riding factor: certainty. The Brown court recognized that an ad hoc
risk-benefit analysis would leave manufacturers with little or no
assurance that their products would not be subject to strict liability.15 1
Accordingly, the Brown court did not categorically exempt prescrip-
tion drugs because of the somewhat ambiguous language of comment
k, but because anything less than blanket protection would render
the underlying policy of comment k moot.
In California, the imposition of a risk-benefit analysis as an initial
hurdle to comment k protection for non-prescription medications
would do little to facilitate the goals articulated by the supreme court
in Brown. The maintenance of current products in the marketplace
would not be enhanced, since the comment k "defense" would be
subject to the whims of individual judges and juries in unrelated
cases involving potentially dissimilar claims. An aspirin manufacturer
in one case could be subject to strict liability where the product was
taken for a minor headache, while in another case, comment k might
be applied where the indication was to reduce the risk of stroke.
The goals of encouraging research and development of new che-
motherapeutic agents and of promoting greater affordability of med-
ications would be uniquely affected by uncertainty in the application
of comment k to OTC drugs. By drawing a distinction between
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risk-benefit analysis on the non-prescription class would effectively
constitute a judicial referendum on a manufacturer's and the FDA's
decision to market a product over-the-counter. Conceivably, a man-
ufacturer developing a new drug, faced with uncertain liability in the
OTC market, might well choose to forego the economic benefits of
non-prescription distribution. If the product possesses only limited
prescription potential, the manufacturer might abandon development
altogether.
Perhaps the most significant effect of the uncertainty fostered by
an ad hoc application of comment k protection would be its impact
on prescription switch-over decisions. It is clear that consistency,
both in terms of regulatory climate and potential liability, are im-
portant factors in a company's decision to begin switch-over pro-
ceedings. In view of the enormous cost savings generated by these
products, a case-by-case approach would not encourage switch-overs,
and could potentially provide a disincentive to OTC marketing in
California.
While there may be some OTC medications which at first glance
seem significantly less important than others, they are not unique to
the non-prescription drug market. 52 Certainly, the "social utility"
of drug products when examined individually varies considerably,
and depends to a large extent on indications for use in a given
clinical situation. However, in choosing to forego a drug-by-drug
evaluation as to the risk-benefit profiles of prescription products, the
Brown court impliedly recognized the "apparently useful and desir-
able" characteristics of prescription drugs as a class. By refusing to
determine the actual medical benefits of individual prescription drugs,
the Brown court obviously intended its categorical exemption of these
medications from strict design defect liability to be potentially ov-
erinclusive since "the benefit of the negligence standard stated in
[comment k] would be greatly diminished if all drugs were required
to run the gauntlet of risk-benefit analysis in order to qualify for
application of the standard.' 1 53 Accordingly, if comment k is to be
applied to non-prescription medications, protection should be granted
unconditionally.
152. One needs only to look at the Physicians Desk Reference (PDR) to identify drugs
which include prescription preparations of dental rinses (sodium fluoride), foot powders
(aluminum chlorhydroxide), wart removers (topical salicylic acid), antiperspirants (aluminum
chloride), acne medications (benzoyl peroxide), dandruff shampoos (chloroxine), skin bleaches
(hyroquinone), not to mention hair restorers (menoxidil).
153. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069 n.11, 751 P.2d at 482 n.11, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424 n.11.
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C. The "Blanket Exemption" Approach
Although the Brown court's determination that all prescription
drugs should be exempted from strict design defect liability pursuant
to comment k was predicated primarily on the observation that
anything less than categorical protection would fall to effectuate the
comment's underlying policy, the policy itself would be meaningless
if it was not based on the assumption that these products, as a class,
are highly useful and desirable. Indeed, courts have consistently
rejected the extension of comment k protection to other non-drug
products which, as a class, are not perceived as having equivalent
social import.1 4 Thus, the question of whether non-prescription drug
products should be categorically exempted from strict design defect
liability depends on the social benefits of these products as a class,
as well as their unavoidably unsafe characteristics.
The medicinal benefits of certain non-prescription medications are
somewhat obvious, even when determined on an individual basis.
However, as Professor Willig has noted, application of comment k
principles to a particular class of products involves an analysis which
"goes beyond an individual decision and contemplates a weighing of
values on a community basis against the known danger involved." 155
The court in Brown utilized this macro-analysis by shifting the focus
from an assessment of individual drug benefits in isolated cases to
an assessment of the overall societal role of prescription medications
in general. 156
154. In addition to prescription drugs, medical devices, and vaccines, comment k has been
applied to one other class, namely, blood products. See, e.g., Miles Laboratories v. Doe, 315
Md. 704, 556 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1989). Even where an argument can be made that individual
products within a larger class have unique social benefits, courts have refused to apply comment
k where the class as a whole cannot claim equivalent social import. See, e.g., Kennan v. Dow
Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 812 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (pesticides), Wilkinson v. Bayshore
Lumber Co., 182 Cal. App. 3d 594, 602-3, 227 Cal. Rptr. 327, 332-33 (1986) (lumber).
155. Willig, supra note 80, at 556.
156. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. It would be ill-
advised to read Brown as confining its analysis of drug benefits to those products which
"eliminate pain and suffering" or which "sustain life." Although these are the general goals
of virtually all pharmaceutical products, they may be achieved in different ways. For example,
drugs may be used to prevent rather than treat conditions. Other products may be used to
diagnose diseases and allow for earlier medical intervention. Finally, many products, including
most non-prescription drugs, are used to alleviate symptoms. Accordingly, the primary defi-
nition of "drugs" utilized by the FDA, without regard to prescription or OTC status, includes,
"articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
in man ... ." 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(B) (West 1972). Because of the enormous cost and
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While the risk-benefit profiles of individual drugs may be subject
to medical controversy- on a situational basis, compensation for
injuries suffered by a relatively small number of individuals predi-
cated upon strict liability may have the effect of reducing the avail-
ability of drugs whose overall benefits are unquestionable. Similarly,
precluding comment k protection for OTC drugs with relatively low
direct medicinal value would fall to take into account significant but
indirect social benefits which exemplify the uniquely interdependent
nature of the marketing of prescription and OTC products in the
pharmaceutical industry. Prescription drugs as a class are generally
intended to assist medical practitioners in treating the underlying
etiology of diseases and their symptomatology. OTC medications as
a class provide similar medical benefits, although their utility ema-
nates more from the treatment of symptoms than of underlying
causative conditions. However, non-prescription drugs, even the most
innocuous, create indirect benefits by reducing overall health costs
and by freeing up primary health care resources so that they become
increasingly affordable and available. It is these indirect benefits
which help to justify an across-the-board application of comment k
to all drugs, including those sold over-the-counter.
Courts must recognize that a clear, yet subtle trend toward the
increasing use of self-medication, or self-care, is rapidly developing
in America. The growing consensus among health care experts is that
self-care is the "wave of the future"' 5 7 in modern medicine. Former
FDA Commissioner, Dr. Frank Young, recently declared:
I think we are about to move into one of the larger expansions of
self-care in the use of diagnostic, monitoring and self-care medicinals
that we have seen in the history of the United States .... The
future will undoubtedly see an acceleration of the trend towards
greater self-care. 158
A number of social and economic forces combine to propel the
current trend toward self-care. Prominent among these forces is the
complexity of federal drug regulations, including stringent requirements relating to safety (risks)
and efficacy (benefits), manufacturers of chemical products are discouraged from making
unsupported health-related claims since they would automatically result in such products being
classified as drugs. See O'Reilly, supra note 93, at 13-9; McNamara, When Is A Cosmetic
Also A Drug-What You Need To Know, And Why, 35 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 467 (1980);
Rodriguez, Cosmetic or Drug? The Minotaur's Labyrinth Revisited, 44 FOOD DRUG Cos.
L.J. 63 (1989).
157. Statement of Matt Clark, Symposium: New Resources in Self-Medication, November
1, 1982, at 25.
158. Statement of Frank Young, Symposium: Self-Care, Self-Medication in America's
Future, February 8, 1988, at 4.
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increasing sophistication of the American consumer. Today's con-
sumer is more knowledgeable about handling everyday health care
problems, and consequently more interested in over-the-counter med-
icines and technology. 159 Moreover, the American consumers' desire
for greater nutrition and physical fitness perpetuates a desire for
greater autonomy in the management of their health-related prob-
lems. 6° Public suspicion of the medical industry, and the development
of home health services, further perpetuates this self-care mentality.' 6'
The economics of health care also contribute to a stronger desire
for self-care. The rising cost of physician visits, coupled with cutbacks
by third party payers (i.e., government and private insurers) is
encouraging more consumers to undertake self-care. 162 These eco-
nomic forces will in turn lead to an increase in demand for new self-
care medicines and technologies including OTC medications. 63
Switch-over drugs will also play a major role in the self-care surge.
The demand for self-care alternatives will be aided by the switch-
over of drugs from prescription to over-the-counter status. 164 Con-
sumer costs will fall as drugs are switched over to OTC status,
providing greater impetus to the self-care trend. 65
Self-care already plays a vital role in our health care system.
Approximately seventy-five percent of all medical care is self-care. 66
A recent survey found that ninety-seven percent of all health care
problems are handled without any physician contact. 167 One expert
estimates that ninety percent of primary care is amendable to some
form of self-care. 61
Over-the-counter drugs, because they play such a critical role in
facilitating self-care, are absolutely essential to the nation's health
159. Statement of Isadore Rosenfeld, Symposium: Self-Care, Self-Medication in America's
Future, February 8, 1988, at 36; Statement of William Bergman, Id., at 51; Lessing, The OTC
Drug Phenomenon: Double-Edged Clinical Implications, 152 MIITARY MED. 577 (1987).
160. Statement of Isadore Rosenfeld, supra note 159, at 36.
161. Smay and Wertheimer, A Review of Over-the-Counter Drug Therapy, 5 J. OF COM-
MUNITY HEALTH 54, 55 (1979).
162. Statement of Isadore Rosenfeld, supra note 159, at 36.
163. Id. at 38.
164. Statement of Donald M. Vickery, Symposium: New Resources in Self-Medication,
November 1, 1982, at 30.
165. Temin, supra note 100, at 189-90.
166. Statement of Donald M. Vickery, supra note 162, at 29; U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1978 U.S. Industrial Outlook 131 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).
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care system. 69 According to the FDA, 500,000 OTC drugs are
currently on the market in the United States. 70 Six of every ten
medicines purchased by U.S. consumers are over-the-counter drugs.'1
7
The World Health Organization estimates that forty million Ameri-
cans take an over-the-counter drug every day. 72 Consequently, Amer-
icans spend at least ten billion dollars annually on over-the-counter
medicines, 73 which amounts to forty percent of consumer expendi-
tures on medicinal products. 74
From a broader perspective, safe, effective, and inexpensive over-
the-counter drugs are critical to the stability of the health care system.
The continuing improvement in the health of Americans has come
at an increasingly higher price. Aside from immediate health benefits,
the greatest contribution of over-the-counter drugs is in helping
consumers control their health care costs. 75 Self-care also frees up
valuable resources necessary for effective primary care. A study found
that a majority of doctors believe that at least twenty-five percent
of patient visits were for conditions that people could treat them-
selves. 176 A reversal in the self-care trend could spell disaster for the
health care industry. Professor Simon Rottenberg has noted:
Self-medication, where appropriately used, releases professional care
resources to higher and better uses .... [A]s the price of physicians'
services has been rising, relative to the cost of other commodities
and services, prudence in the use of professional, medical care
services is increasingly urgent.... If only 2% of OTC drug con-
sumers in the United States chose to visit primary care practitioners,
rather than using self-medication, the annual increase in patients'
office visits would be 292 million, a 62% rise. To maintain the
same quality of consultive care, the number of primary care prac-
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medication is essential to the nation's health care system, it is imperative that OTC drugs
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titioners would have to be increased from the present 91,000 to
147,400. The increased cost to produce the additional 56,400 needed
doctors would be ... a total of $10 billion. 77
The overall economic value of self-medication further illuminates
the importance of a prosperous over-the-counter drug industry. Health
care spending now accounts for eleven percent of our gross national
product.' 78 The gross savings from OTC drugs, in terms of lost time
from work, professional visits, and use of prescription drugs, is
estimated at $24 billion annually.' 79
The continued growth of the OTC drug market has been projected
to result in $73 billion in gross savings by the year 2000, with a net
benefit to the economy of $34 billion. 80 However, future growth in
the non-prescription drug market will depend to a large extent on
the willingness of manufacturers, as well as the FDA, to allow
distribution of more potent medications directly to consumers. Un-
certainty regarding liability will be a major factor in future decisions
in that regard. Accordingly, courts should act now to ensure comment
k application to OTC drugs so this uncertainty can be effectively
mitigated. Only a blanket approach can achieve this end.
CONCLUSION
Litigation involving the liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers
has largely focused on the effects of prescription medications. So
far, little scrutiny has been given to the principles which govern
compensation for injuries attributable to over-the-counter medica-
tions. Given the increased consumer demand for more potent non-
prescription drugs, inevitably courts will ultimately face the question
of how liability for these products should be imposed.
The California Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v.
Superior Court does not specifically address whether strict design
defect liability should apply to OTC product injuries. However, the
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31, 1980 at 30-33.
178. Statement of Willian Roper, Symposium: Self-Care, Self-Medication in America's
Future, February 8, 1988, at 11.
179. Statement of Charles Kline, id. at 16.
180. Id. at 18. Professor Temin estimates that the switch-over of hydrocortisone alone will
result in some $400 million in net benefits. Professor Temin also estimates that the potential
switch-over of low doses of oral penicillin could result in a saving of over $1 billion. Temin,
supra note 100, at 194, 199.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22
court's opinion does provide an analytic framework which courts
may use to determine whether products other than prescription drugs
should be exempted from strict liability.
When over-the-counter medications are analyzed as a class, their
exclusion from the ambit of comment k seems difficult to justify.
Categorically, the OTC products are virtually indistinguishable from
many prescription drugs. All drugs are unavoidably unsafe to some
degree even when used according to directions. They confer signifi-
cant direct and indirect benefit both on an individual and societal
scale. Finally, since they are developed and manufactured by an
industry which predicates allocation of research and development
resources, to a large extent, on marketing certainty and stability,
their introduction to, and maintenance on the market place may be
uniquely affected by the imposition of certain forms of liability.
Courts considering the application of comment k to preclude strict
design defect liability in litigation involving non-prescription drugs
will be faced with precisely the same issues which influenced the
California Supreme Court's decision in Brown. Those issues will
largely concern the scope and practical implementation of the com-
ment k exemption.
The language and history of comment k suggest that comment k
was intended to apply to at least some non-prescription medications.
Some courts, focusing primarily on the wording of the comment,
have advocated an ad hoc approach to its application in cases
involving prescription medications. The Brown court went beyond
the admittedly ambiguous language of the comment and determined
that, in order for its underlying policies to be adequately facilitated,
prescription drugs as a class must be exempted from strict design
defect liability. Similarly, if courts are to grant non-prescription
medications relief from such liability, it must be provided across the
board. The liability for injuries attributable to any drug product
approved for market by the Food and Drug Administration should
only be imposed where a jury finds that the warnings provided to
consumers or to the medical community failed to reflect risks which
were known, or should have been known, by manufacturers prior to
a plaintiff's ingestion of the drug.
